This paper evaluates the effectiveness of short-time work schemes in preserving jobs and reducing the segmentation in dual markets. For that purpose, we use an equilibrium search and matching model and the Spanish 2012 labour market reform as a benchmark. The steady-state results show that the availability of short-time working schemes does not necessarily reduce unemployment and job destruction. The effectiveness depends on the degree of subsidization of payroll taxes. The costbenefit analysis shows that there is scope for Pareto improvements although, in some cases, a lump sum subsidy is necessary to compensate for the welfare loss.
Introduction
There is some consensus about the fact that some labour markets, with the most striking case involving Germany, have cooped reasonably well with what is now being referred to as the "Great Recession". Part of the reason has to do with the availability of shorttime work schemes at the start of the crisis, that helped in preserving jobs and, what's even more important, firm's specific human capital, and prevented aggregate demand from falling prey to a global decrease in production. On the contrary, in some countries like Spain, modifying hours and wages was virtually impossible at the beginning of the crisis. This fact together with the dual labour market structure present in the Spanish labour market has lead to the highest rate of job destruction in the European Area (EA), particularly with regards to temporary jobs, thus generating a huge jump in unemployment from 8% in 2007 to 25% in 2012, 1 and given the long lasting duration of the crisis, a disproportionate rise in long term unemployment with the consequently deterioration in workers' skills.
It was only in 2012 that the Spanish government introduced a comprehensive reform that introduced major changes in both external and internal flexibility by bringing the procedures involved closer to the modus operandi throughout the rest of Europe. Regarding internal flexibility, the reform allowed for an internal devaluation by facilitating the adjustment of hours and wages to changes in a firm's economic conditions as an alternative to job destruction. 2 Moreover, the reform introduced important changes in the system of collective wage bargaining agreements that have improved the way firms adapt to changing economic conditions, thereby preserving their specific investment in human capital. 3 Regarding the external aspect, there has been a considerable reduction in severance payments for unfair dismissals, from 45 to 33 days of wages p.y.o.s, bringing this indemnity closer to the mean OECD compensation, which is 21 days of wages p.y.o.s (See OECD, 2013).
In García and Osuna (2014), we evaluated the effects of the Spanish 2012 labour market reform concerning the changes in employment protection. In this paper we add the availability of short-time work schemes to evaluate the effectiveness of these policies in preserving jobs and reducing the segmentation in dual labour markets, using Spain as a benchmark. The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we compute the steady state effects of the 2012 Spanish labour market reform concerning the reduction in severance costs and the availability of short-time work schemes on unemployment, job destruction and the tenure distribution And second, we perform a transition exercise to evaluate the changes in welfare and the costs of these policies.
Accordingly, we use an equilibrium model of job creation and destruction of the search and matching type that extends the one proposed in García and Osuna (2014) . The ingredients of that model intending to capture the specific features of the Spanish economy were: (i) the existence of a segmented labour market with two types of jobs (permanent and temporary) that differ in productivity, in the maximum length of the contract and in the associated severance costs; (ii) endogenous job conversion of TCs into PCs; (iii) severance costs modelled as a transfer from the firm to the worker, and as a function of seniority; (iv) downward wage rigidities such that severance costs have real effects 4 . In this paper, we add the possibility of reducing the number of hours worked using short-time work schemes. In this labour market, firms will be heterogeneous agents and use these two types of contracts as well as the number of hours worked to endogenously adjust their employment levels when facing idiosyncratic persistent shocks. We follow Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) by assuming one-job firms.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In Section 3, we discuss its calibration. In Section 4, we evaluate the reform. Finally, in Section 5, we draw some conclusions.
The model

Population
The economy is populated by a continuum of workers with a unit mass and a continuum of firms. Workers can either be employed or unemployed. Hence, we do not consider being out of the labour force as an additional state. Unemployed workers look for employment opportunities; employed workers produce and do not search for jobs. Firms post vacancies or produce. The cost of having a vacancy open is c v . Posting a vacancy is not job creation unless it is filled. Each firm is a one-job firm, and the job may be occupied and producing or vacant. We assume free entry.
The source of heterogeneity is due to the existence of matches with different quality levels and durations. Therefore, the state space that describes the situation of a particular worker is S = {{0, 1} × E × D}, where E = {ε 1 , ..., ε n } is a discrete set for the quality levels and D = {1, ..., N} is also a discrete set denoting the duration of a job (worker's seniority). Each triple indicates whether the worker is unemployed (0) or employed (1), the quality and the duration of the match.
Preferences
Workers have identical preferences, live infinitely and maximise their utility, which is taken to be linear in consumption. We assume that they supply work inelastically, i.e., they will accept any opportunity that arises. Thus, each worker has preferences defined by ∑ ∞ t=1 β t c t , where β is the discount factor (0 ≤ β < 1) and c t is individual consumption. Firms are further assumed to be risk neutral.
Technologies
Production technology
Each job is characterised by an irreversible technology and produces one unit of a differentiated product per period whose price is y(ε t ), where {ε t } is an idiosyncratic component, i.e., the quality of the match. This idiosyncratic component is modelled as a stationary and finite Markov chain. This process is the same for each match, and the realisations ε t+1 are independent and identically distributed with conditional transition probabilities Γ(ε |ε) = Pr{ε t+1 |ε t }, where ε, ε ∈ E = {1, 2, ..., n ε }. Each new match starts with the same entry level ε e , and from this initial condition, the quality of the match evolves stochastically due to these idiosyncratic shocks. We assume that agents know the law of motion of the process and observe their realisations at the beginning of the period.
Matching technology
In each period, vacancies and unemployed workers are stochastically matched. We assume the existence of an homogeneous of degree one matching function m = m(u, v), increasing and concave in both arguments, where v is the number of vacancies and u is the number of unemployed workers, both normalised by the fixed labour force. Given the properties of the matching function, the transition rates for vacancies, q, and unemployed workers, α, depend only on θ = v/u, a measure of tightness in the labour market. The vacancy transition rate, q, is defined as the probability of filling a vacancy, and the transition rate for unemployed workers, α, is defined as the probability of finding a job. These are given by
Equilibrium
The concept of equilibrium as used herein is recursive equilibrium. Before showing the problems that agents solve, it is convenient to explain the timing and the agents' decisions. At the beginning of the period, firms' idiosyncratic shocks are revealed for existing matches. Firms and workers then renegotiate wages. Given these wages, firms choose between three options: i) to continue producing with the current match, ii) to continue producing with the current match at a reduced number of hours, or iii) to terminate the match and dismiss the worker. The nature of the problem depends on whether the firm has a PC or a TC. PCs entail high severance costs that depend on the quality of the match and on the duration of the contract, while severance costs for TCs depend also on both dimensions but are, in comparison, very low. In addition, the problem is not the same for all firms with a TC. Let d denote the duration of the contract. We will assume that a TC cannot last more than d t max periods, and thus, the maximum number of renewals is d t max − 1. Therefore, firms whose TCs cannot be renewed decide between these three options: i) to convert the TC into a full time PC, taking into account the consequences regarding future severance costs, ii) to convert the TC into a PC at a reduced number of hours, or ii) to terminate the match. Once all these decisions have been made, production starts both in firms where workers have not been fired during this period and in those that were matched with unemployed workers at the end of the last period. Finally, search decisions are made, and firms post vacancies for which the unemployed workers apply. This search process generates new matches that will be productive over the next period. Accordingly, there follows a formal description of the problems faced by both firms and workers.
Vacancy Creation
Every job is created as a temporary job according to the following equation
where V is the value of a vacant job, J tc (ε e , 1) is the value function of a firm with a firstperiod TC and ε e is the entry level match quality. All vacancies lead to TC jobs, which may later be transformed to PC jobs.
The Firm's Problem
The problem of firms with TCs
The problem of a firm with a TC, whose length at the end of the last period was less than d t max , is Osuna (2014) , based on Spanish evidence, we assume that temporary workers are less productive than permanent workers, and we introduce this feature through a productivity gap, γ. Note that a greater value of ε increases output. On the other hand, wages and severance costs are both increasing in ε and d.
If it is more profitable to continue with the actual match working standard hours (first row greater than second and third row in Equation 2), the decision rule will be g tc (ε, d) = h f t and the fulltime match will continue. If it is more profitable to continue with the actual match at a reduced number of hours, g tc (ε, d) = h pt . Otherwise, g tc (ε, d) = 0, and the worker will be fired, whereby the firm incurs the severance cost, s tc (ε, d − 1), plus the vacancy cost and, with probability q(θ ) at the end of this period, the firm will fill the vacant job with a TC that will be productive in the next period.
The problem of firms with prospective permanent contracts (PPCs)
The problem is slightly different for a firm whose TC has reached its maximum length at the end of the previous period. If the worker is not fired at the beginning of this period, the TC will be automatically transformed into a PC. Note that in this case d = d t max + 1, where d t max + 1 denotes the first period in a PC, and that severance costs are given by s tc (ε, d − 1) because if the worker is not promoted, the severance cost corresponds to the period the worker has spent on a TC. As in García and Osuna (2014), based on the evidence, we assume that firms incur a training cost, τ, in the first period of a PC, that reduces the productivity of the job in that period. This problem can thus be written as If it is more profitable to continue with the actual match working standard hours, the decision rule will be g ppc (ε, d) = h f t , and the TC will be converted to a fulltime PC. If it is more profitable to continue with the actual match at a reduced number of hours, g ppc (ε, d) = h pt . Otherwise, g ppc (ε, d) = 0, and the worker will be fired.
The problem of firms with existing PCs
A firm with a PC must decide whether to continue with the actual match or to dismiss the worker and search for a new one. This problem can be written as (2014), based on the evidence, it is assumed that permanent workers are more productive as tenure increases. This feature is introduced through the experience function Λ(d). Therefore, for a given value of ε, more tenure on the job makes the job even more productive. The interpretation of this equation is again analogous to the previous ones. If it is more profitable to continue with the actual fulltime match, the decision rule will be g pc (ε, d) = h f t , and the match will continue. If it is more profitable to continue with the actual match but at a reduced number of hours, the decision rule will be g pc (ε, d) = h pt , and the match will continue. Otherwise, g pc (ε, d) = 0, and the worker will be fired.
The Worker's Problem
The value functions of workers in TCs, PPCs and PCs can be written as follows
where
) denote worker's value functions in TCs, PPCs and PCs,Φ(x) is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the assessment is true and zero otherwise, ω is a subsidy that workers on short-time are entitled to, and U is the value function of an unemployed worker, whose equation is
where W tc (ε e , 1) is the value function of a worker in a first-period TC and the parameter b can be interpreted as an unemployment subsidy. Hence, an unemployed worker receives b today and, by the end of the period, the probability that the worker will find a job is α(θ ) whereas the probability that the worker will remain unemployed is 1 − α(θ ).
Law of motion for unemployment
Given the previously shown policy rules, the law of motion for unemployment is (9) where N pc t−1 , N ppc t−1 and N tc t−1 denote beginning of period t employment levels in PCs, PPCs and TCs, respectively, and U t is the level of unemployment at the end of period t. The interpretation of the equation is the following: Unemployment at the end of period t, U t , is the sum of the stock of unemployment at the beginning of period t, U t−1 , plus the inflows into unemployment (the three terms with indicator functions) during period t, minus the outflow from unemployment during period t, α(θ )U t−1 . Note that the second RHS term sums up the values of the g pc i (ε, d) for every worker holding a PC at the beginning of period t, when the decision to continue or to fire takes place. For instance, for those workers fired at the beginning of period t, g pc i (ε, d) = 0 and, therefore, they will be part of the unemployment pool. The third and fourth RHS terms have a similar interpretation, but for workers with prospective PCs and TCs, respectively.
Wage Determination
Wages are the result of bilateral bargaining between the worker and the firm, unless the legally imposed minimum wage, w min , is binding. 5 Bargaining is dynamic, i.e., wages are revised for each period based upon the occurrence of new shocks. The assumption of bilateral bargaining is reasonable due to the existence of sunk costs (search costs) once the match has been produced. This creates local monopoly power and generates a surplus to be split among the participants in the match. In TCs, this surplus is defined as
Wages are the result of maximising the following Nash product with respect to the wage
The first order condition of this maximisation is such that the surplus is split into fixed proportions according to the worker's bargaining power, π
By making the appropriate substitutions of firms' and workers' value functions, the wage in a fulltime TC can be computed as
Following the same procedure, the wage in firms with fulltime PPCs turns out to be
And, finally, in firms with PCs
Note that wages in PPCs are lower than those prevailing in the following periods because of the associated training costs and because, as in Osuna (2005) , firms try to internalise higher future wages (due to higher future severance costs) by pushing down wages in first-period PCs. Moreover, for any given productivity level, wages in TCs are lower than in existing PCs because of the assumed productivity gap.
Definition of Equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium is a list of value functions 
Free entry:
This condition and the profit maximisation condition guarantee that, in equilibrium, the number of vacancies adjusts to eliminate all the rents associated with holding a vacancy; that is, V = 0, implying c v = β q(ν)J tc (ε e , 1).
Wage bargaining:
The equilibrium conditions from maximising the surplus in existing TCs are given in equations (12) and (13). Similar conditions hold for other types of contracts.
Calibration
In this section, we explain the data set, the procedure for assigning values to the model's parameters and the selection of functional forms.
The Data Set and Model Period
To . All employment and unemployment spells lasting more than six months are used. The model period is chosen to be a year for consistency with these data and because it is reasonable from a computational perspective.
Calibrated Parameters and Functional Forms
There are two types of calibrated parameters in our model. Those that have a clear counterpart in the real economy, and those that do not. For the former, we use the implied parameter values. For some of the latter, we use the values estimated in empirical studies, and for the rest, we use the simulated method of moments to calibrate their values.
Preferences
The utility function is linear in consumption, as is usual in this literature. The value of the discount factor, β = .97, is fixed so that it is consistent with the mean annual real interest rate in the reference period, 3%.
Production Technology
The production function is assumed to be linear in the idiosyncratic shock, y(ε) = ε. The idiosyncratic shock is modelled as a Markov chain, Γ[(ε )|(ε)]. In addition, we assume five possible quality levels. In general, these two assumptions would imply 20 restrictions to fix the values of the conditional transition probabilities between different quality levels. Assuming that the expected duration of good and bad idiosyncratic shocks coincides,
, we need only to estimate 15 transition probabilities. Given that we do not have direct information on the quality of the match, we use the procedure described in Tauchen (1986) to parameterise the five quality levels and the transition probabilities. To apply this procedure, we need to know the mean (µ), the standard deviation (σ ) and the autocorrelation coefficient (ρ) of the underlying idiosyncratic process. We use wages for the period 2004 to 2011 to approximate the process. The values for these parameters turned out to be µ = .33, σ = .11 and ρ = .75. We normalise µ to the value of 1 to make the calibration more intuitive and more easily interpretable.
On the other hand, using the calibration sample, the productivity gap parameter is set to 13.5% based on the ratio between wages for permanent and temporary workers with equal experience. 7 Finally, the positive experience effect on the productivity of permanent workers is parametrized through the function
Matching Technology
We assume a Cobb-Douglas homogeneous of degree one matching function, m = m(v, u) = Av η (u) 1−η , where A is the degree of mismatch and η is the value of the elasticity of the number of matches with respect to vacancies.
Unemployment Benefits
The parameter b is interpreted as the income flow of unemployment. We obtain b = .2 as the product of unemployment benefits and coverage for the period 2004 to 2011, normalised by average productivity. 8 
Minimum wage
The parameter w min is set using information on the average minimum wage set in collective agreements (See Lacuesta et al., 2012). For the period 2004-2011, this minimum wage is 860 Euros. Given a median wage of 1200 Euros, the ratio between the two is 0.72, which 7 See García and Osuna (2014) for a discussion on the robustness of this choice. 8 In the period 2004 to 2011, the monthly average unemployment benefits and coverages are, respectively, 758 euros and 31%. The sources of these data are the Bulletin of Labour Statistics edited by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, the Spanish Labour Force Survey, and the National Employment Office.
is the ratio that we impose in the model to parameterize w min = .72.
To summarise, the calibration exercise involves the assignment of values to two types of parameters. The discount rate, β , the parameters of the idiosyncratic process, (µ, σ and ρ), the productivity gap parameter ,γ, unemployment benefits, b and the minimum wage, w min are set independently from the rest, as they have clear counterparts in the real economy (See Table 1 ). On the other hand, the workers' bargaining power, π, the value for the elasticity of new matches with respect to the vacancy input, η, and the cost of posting a vacancy, The three remaining parameters: training cost, τ, experience, λ , and mismatch, A, are calibrated using the method of simulated moments. Table 2 displays the three conditions that are imposed to set these parameters. This calibration exercise shows that the initial steady-state of the model (status quo) is a good starting point for investigating the behaviour of this economy because it matches the Spanish data fairly closely. 
Severance cost and social security functions
Status Quo Severance Cost Function
To compute equilibrium, we need a severance cost function that represents the severance costs in Spain for the period under study. We use the following pieces of information to estimate the severance cost function in PCs: legal compensation in fair dismissals (20 days of wages p.y.o.s. with a maximum of 12 monthly wages) and unfair dismissals (45 days of wages p.y.o.s. with a maximum of 42 monthly wages), procedural wages 9 of approximately two months, and the fact that, on average, 74.3% of all severance processes were declared unfair during the period 2004 to 2011. 10 Regarding the dismissal distribution, on average, 7% were collective dismissals, 20.9% were agreed upon at the units of mediation, 57.6% followed the procedure specified in Spain's Law 45/2002 and only 14.5% involved litigation. 11 Using these observations, and after rearranging terms, we arrive at the following final expression of the severance cost function for PCs is s pc = 44.1
, where d and w denote a worker's seniority and annual wage, respectively. 12 Note, in particular, that the second additive term of the severance cost function displayed in the main text is not multiplied by tenure because this term reflects procedural wages and that legal severance costs depend on the wage. Because making the severance cost function depend on wages is computationally very difficult to manage, we take the quality of the match as an approximation of the wage.
Finally, TCs entail a severance cost of eight days of wages p.y.o.s and no procedural wages. Therefore, the severance cost function for TCs is s tc = 8 w 365 (d − 1). Following Güell and Petrongolo (2007), we have set d t max = 3, as this has been the usual practice in Spain since the introduction of TCs in 1984. 9 Procedural wages are those wages associated with the interim period between a workers dismissal, contested in court, and the judges decision declaring it unfair. 10 The distribution of dismissals is taken from the Bulletin of Labour Statistics. 11 The number of days actually agreed upon is not made public, but they are presumed to be very close to the legal limit. On the other hand, the 2002 reform (Law 45/2002) abolished the firm's obligation to pay procedural wages when dismissed workers appeal to labour courts, as long as the firm acknowledges the dismissal as being unfair and deposits the corresponding severance pay within two days of the dismissal. 12 To get the equation displayed in the text, one needs to rearrange terms in the following expression: s pc = 7%[45 
Social Security and Wage Subsidy Parameters
In the Status Quo, Social security taxes in PCs and TCs, amount to 109 and 115 days of wages per year, respectively. We will refer to the proportion of social security taxes that are used to pay for the health and the public pension system as "payroll taxes", to distinguish it from the rest, "unemployment taxes", which are used to pay the unemployment benefits. This distinction will matter when we consider short-time work schemes because only payroll taxes may be subsidized. The general function presented in the model Section that is used to represent social security taxes, ξ pc (w pc f t , w pc pt ) and ξ tc (w tc f t , w tc pt ) will adopt a particular form depending on the availability and the amount of the subsidy that firms are entitled to.
On the other hand, in order to avoid drastic reductions in net income as a result of the short-time work schemes, workers are usually entitled to a wage subsidy, which in Spain amounts to 50% of the wage, implying ω = 0.5.
Main Findings
This section reports the answers to the questions posed. Section 4.1 shows the status quo (SQ) values of the set of statistics of interest. Section 4.2 shows the predicted steady-state effects of the changes in Employment Protection (EPL) implied by the 2012 labour market reform. Section 4.3 combine these effects with those of short-time work allowance. Finally, Section 4.4 shows the welfare implications and the cost of these policies. Table 3 shows the status quo values of the statistics of interest: the unemployment rate and tenure distribution. The unemployment rate, u, is slightly higher when compared with 13 Based on the fact that most firings in the past reached an amount very close to the legal limit, we have set 33 days of wages p.y.o.s for every firing regardless of whether the dismissal is a fair or an unfair one. n d=i stands for the proportion of workers in period i andd d≤6 stands for the average tenure for those employed with a tenure equal to or under six years. the actual data. 14 Regarding tenure distribution, the model reproduces reasonably well the average tenure for those employed with a tenure equal to or under six years,d d≤6 , in the SQ. In fact, the model is able to reproduce quite accurately the proportion of workers, n d with seniorities d = 2, d = 3, d = 4 and d = 5, but it underestimates the proportion of workers with a tenure equal to or under one year, n d=1 . 15 
The Status Quo
Steady-state effects of the 2012 reform: EPL changes
This section shows the steady-state effects of the 2012 reform concerning the changes in PCs and TCs employment protection, focusing on the effects on unemployment rates, job destruction and the tenure distribution.
Column 3 in Table 4 , referred to as Reform A, indicates that this reform reduces unemployment by 11.2%, from 17.3% to 15.4%. On the other hand, aggregate job destruction, JD, decreases by 6.2%, as a result of a composition effect of an increase in the permanent job destruction rate (JDp) and a decrease in the temporary job destruction rate (JDt). In fact, the temporary job destruction rate decreases by 17.1%, from 26.7% to 22.2%, because the lower gap in severance costs makes firms more prone to convert TCs into PCs. The reduction in the severance cost gap diminishes the pervasive incentives to destroy jobs at the beginning of period four: the job destruction rate JD d=4 changes from 30.6% to 10.6%. The opposite happens, however, for the permanent job destruction rate, which increases by 8.4%, from 7.4% to 8.0%, because firing permanent workers has become cheaper. These changes in job destruction rates have an impact on tenure distribution. The proportion of workers with a tenure equal to or under one year, n d=1 , is 11% lower, and the proportion of workers with a tenure of more than three years, n d>3 , increases by 10%, from 52.7% to 57.9%.
Steady-state effects of the 2012 reform: EPL change and short-time allowance
In this section, we add an increase in internal flexibility, that is, the possibility or reducing hours worked by using a short-time work scheme in order to prevent firings when firms are hit by negative idiosyncratic shocks. In particular, firms will have the option of reducing hours worked by 10%, 40% or 70%, depending on the magnitude of the adverse shock. The effects of the three different short-time work schemes are shown in Table 4 . In the first one (Reform B), firms pay full social security taxes irrespective of the reduction in hours work. In the second one (Reform C), payroll taxes are subsidized by 33%. And, in the third one (Reform D), payroll taxes are reduced in the same proportion as hours worked. Table 4 shows that both external and internal flexibility when combined do not necessarily induce a higher reduction in the unemployment rate than when only the increase in external flexibility is considered. This is true under Reform C and D, but not under Reform B. Not only that, in fulltime equivalents the unemployment rate under Reform B is higher than under Reform A, 16.6 versus 15.4, where only the change in EPL is considered, and the rest of the statistics are very similar. In fact, in the absence of the additional flexibility provided by Reform B, firms convert TCs into PCs fulltime jobs, while under Reform B, the same number of jobs are converted, but to partime jobs instead. In the transition exercise we will show the amount of this deadweight loss.
On the contrary, in those scenarios where payroll taxes are partly subsidized (Reforms C and D), the unemployment and the temporary job destruction rates decrease substantially. In particular, under Reform C, the temporary job destruction rate decreases by 54% (66% under Reform D), versus 17% when only the external flexibility was considered (Reform A). In the status quo the temporary job destruction rate was higher both, because of the larger gap in severance costs and because of the impossibility or reducing hours worked. The additional flexibility provided by these reforms make firms more prone to continue with the matches albeit at a reduced number of hours worked in some instances. As to the effects in job destruction rates in the early durations, JD d=2 , JD d=3 and JD d=4 decrease dramatically to 6.6%, 14.5% and 5.2% under Reform D. Consequently, the tenure distribution changes drastically, becoming much smoother. The proportion of workers with one year of tenure decreases from 20.4% to 13.4% and the proportion of workers with more than three years of tenure increases from 52.7% to 63.5%.
At first sight it would seem that unemployment decrease less under Reform C than under Reform D, 28% versus 32%. However, the picture changes if we compare unemployment in fulltime equivalents, whereby the reduction in the unemployment rate is larger under Re- form C, 24% versus 18% under Reform D. This result is due to the different incentives that these two short-time work schemes induce. Under Reform C, the reduction in payroll taxes is independent of the reduction in hours worked while, under Reform D, the reduction in payroll taxes is proportional to the reduction in hours worked, thereby creating an incentive to preserve more short-time jobs. In fact both, the temporary job destruction rate and the job destruction rate at the beginning of period four, are lower under Reform D because job conversion is higher, but at the expense of reducing the number of hours.
To summarize, except under Reform B, adding internal flexibility implies lower unemployment, lower aggregate and temporary job destruction rates and a smoother tenure distribution. Without a measurement of welfare and of the cost of these policies it is not possible to provide a policy recommendation. It seems clear that Reform B is the worst in terms of these statistics; even worse than the sole reduction in severance costs. But Reform C and D are more difficult to judge with the information provided because average hours worked are higher under Reform C scenario, but more jobs are preserved under Reform D.
The transition
As it is well known, an assessment of a policy cannot be carried out based on steady state comparisons. In order to assess the implications of the policies, we perform a transition exercise. For this purpose, we take a sub-sample of workers from the MCVL data set previously described, beginning working in 2010 and who differ in several dimensions, such as whether they are employed or unemployed, the type of contract, tenure on the contract and productivity level (proxied by qualification) and we follow them for 12 years. We compare the convergence of this particular initial distribution, which is not in steadystate, to five different steady-states: the status quo, the 2012 Reform with only external flexibility, and the 2012 Reform with both external and internal flexibility with the three scenarios already discussed in the previous section. In every scenario, workers are subject to the same shocks, but their employment histories are different because the policy rules are different.
To gauge the welfare change induced by these reforms we compute the equivalent variation (EV) expressed as an income annuity. For each individual, we rewrite his/her utility along the transition as an income annuity that generates the same welfare level. Then we measure the "welfare loss" induced by a particular reform simply as the difference in the individual annuity values in the two institutional settings (the annuity value in the status quo minus the annuity in the reform). A positive value implies a larger utility in the status quo. Furthermore, the change in welfare is expressed in euros, which allows for an easy comparison to the financial calculations discussed below. To obtain an aggregate welfare figure we compute an average of the individual "welfare losses" across the individuals in the sample.
In order to have a complete picture, we also compute the costs implied by the status quo and by the reform scenarios as a constant annuity to facilitate comparison with the welfare measurement defined above. We compute the net cost that each individual represents for the public system. It is assessed by computing the present discounted value of all payments that will be received along the transition, net of all contributions to be made in the same period. The calculation reflects the fact that workers can change their labor state in the future, as a result of the exogenous sources of uncertainty in the model, and takes into account that individuals will react optimally, according to the institutional environment. Apparently, this reforms seems to be Pareto improving because welfare increases, due to the increase in average income, and the fiscal balance significantly improves. According to the EV measure, individuals will be willing to pay 105 euros to implement the reform. Average income increases mainly as a result of the increase in the average wage, which is coherent with the Lazear result: the decrease in severance costs is compensated by higher wages. 16 On the other hand, the amount of average unemployment benefits is lower because of the reduction in the unemployment rate, and also the average indemnity is lower both, because severance costs are lower and because there are few firings.
Regarding costs for the State, this reform is the cheapest. First, there are no wage subsidies to pay for the reductions in hours worked as under Reforms B, C and D. And, second, there are no additional social security contributions to pay to compensate for the reduction in payroll taxes as in Reforms C and D. In terms of unemployment benefits and social security contributions made by the state on the part of the unemployed, this reform is not very costly (although it is costlier than Reforms C and D) and it is, in fact, cheaper than Reform B, despite having very similar statistics, because average unemployment duration is lower. Finally, the amount of payroll taxes paid by firms is lower than under Reforms C and D because there is more unemployment and consequently less revenue.
Reform B: EPL change and short-time with no subsidy
In this case, the small welfare loss could be compensated by the improvement in the fiscal balance. This reform is not very costly when compared to the other reforms that allow for short-time work because the average wage subsidy is relatively small, despite the higher payments made by the State in terms of unemployment benefits and social security contributions.
However, this reform does not make much sense because it is worse in all dimensions than the reform that only changes EPL: unemployment and the job destruction statistics are higher, average tenure is lower and the tenure distribution is not as smooth. In addition, welfare is lower and the fiscal balance does not improve as much as in Reform A.
Moreover, there is a some deadweight in the job conversion decision. That is, in the absence of the policy concerning the reduction in hours worked, job conversion for some productivity levels would have still taken place, but to fulltime jobs.
Reform C: EPL change and short-time with a 33% subsidy
In this case, the welfare improvement is greater than the fiscal balance deterioration. Therefore, a lump sum tax could be levied on individuals to compensate for the passing of the reform. However, this reform is very costly for the State. In terms of revenue is the second after Reform D, but the costs are huge mainly because of the wage subsidies, which are quite substantial. The other costs, the amount of unemployment benefits and the social security contributions made by the state on the part of the unemployed, are quite low because of the significant reduction in the unemployment rate.
Reform D: EPL change and short-time with a proportional subsidy
In this case the negative welfare impact measured as the EV does not exceed the costs saved. There are resources available to compensate the losses created by the institutional change. Average income is lower due to the lower wages in short-time jobs and the lower amount of unemployment benefits given the low unemployment rate. Also, the average job subsidy is relatively low because the reduction in hours worked is quite substantial in some cases.
Regarding the costs for the State, they are relatively low because unemployment is low and the fact that firms get a proportional reduction in the payroll tax when they put workers on short-time does not deteriorate the fiscal balance position because jobs are prevented from being destroyed and, therefore, revenue is large.
Conclusion
This paper has evaluated the effectiveness of short-time work schemes in preserving jobs and reducing the segmentation in dual markets. For that purpose, we have used an equilibrium search and matching model and the Spanish 2012 labour market reform as a benchmark. The steady-state results have shown that the availability of short-time working schemes does not necessarily reduce unemployment and job destruction. The effectiveness depends on the degree of subsidization of payroll taxes. On the other hand, the cost-benefit analysis has shown that there is scope for Pareto improvements although, in some cases, a lump sum subsidy is necessary to compensate for the welfare loss.
